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The spiralling costs of hosting sports mega-events (SMEs) are usually justified 
by the ‘legacies’ that they produce. Therefore, this article begins by 
problematizing the notion of SME ‘legacies’ and the benefits they are intended 
to bring to hosts. The article serves as a general introduction to the papers that 
follow in this Special Issue. Common to all papers is a concern with the multi-
faceted nature of ‘legacy’, its meaning to a variety of stakeholders involved in 
such events and how this impacts policy. The belief in the causal relationship 
between hosting major events and the realization of specific legacies – 
increased sport participation in London’s case, highlighted in this paper – 
underpinned the UK’s bidding for, and subsequent hosting of, the Olympics. 
Thus, this paper serves as a discussion of some of the key concepts in, and 
assumptions about, the use of SMEs to produce a legacy for the hosting state.  
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Introduction  
The following serves to introduce this Special Issue on ‘State Strategies for Leveraging Sports 
Mega-Events’ by discussing one of the generic concepts concerning all contributions: ‘legacy’. It 
does so by offering a discussion of the London 2012 Olympics and the UK Government’s legacy 
ambitions. The London case study is a reminder, if one was needed, of the political nature of 
sport and sports mega-events, with the UK government’s close involvement in its acquisition, 
financing, hosting and use as a political tool to impact policy. Several factors have come together 
in the past twenty to thirty years to elevate the political nature of sports mega-events (SMEs) and 
render their study more relevant than ever. Of the most salient for the discussion that follows 
are: first, an increasingly wide range of states – beyond the ‘capitalist-communist’ duality of the 
Cold War – have sought to host these events. Now it would appear that it is not just a case of 
‘East’ versus ‘West’ or ‘authoritarian’ versus ‘democratic’, but a wide variety of regime types have 
entered the SME market place, including all of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa) and some outliers such as the autocratic Qatar. A second factor is both the 
escalating costs and the increasingly substantial sums of taxpayers’ resources that are regularly 
being sunk into hosting such events. Russia broke all previous records when investing some $55 
billion in the Sochi Winter Olympics – more than all previous Winter Olympics put together. 
Despite the fact that the majority of this spend was on non-sporting infrastructure, it took 
Olympic expenditure to new heights (or lows). Third, a justificatory discourse around spending 
on elite sport events has developed in which certain ‘legacies’ are advanced as the key return on 
investment. As we shall see, this appears to be contagious, as new ‘emerging’ states seamlessly 
take on the ‘hoped-for’ legacies that advanced capitalist states propagate. Finally, despite 
mounting evidence that many of these SME legacies have failed to materialise, the perennial and 
expensive sports event cycle continues with little policy learning taking place. It is perhaps 
paradoxical, then, that the continued justification for public spending on hosting sports mega-
events appears increasingly ‘rationalised by an appeal to legacy’ (Tomlinson, 2014, 139).  
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Given the centrality of ‘legacies’ in the justification of bidding for and hosting of the majority of 
SMEs, it seems pertinent to discuss this concept in a little more depth. As the concept ‘legacy’ is 
so important in justifying the (usually public) investment in SMEs, it is here where we start by 
unpacking what key stakeholders understand it to mean. This ranges from academic debates 
through the media to – what we term - the specific ‘coalition of beneficiaries’ that advocate 
hosting such events in the first place.i  After clarifying the use and abuse of ‘legacy’ as a concept, 
we review the literature to reveal five, broad hoped-for legacies that are usually fore-fronted by 
governments and sports event advocates in advance of hosting SMEs. We then turn to an 
analysis of London’s Olympic legacy promise of ‘inspiring a generation’ to take part in sport and 
physical activity.  
‘Legacy’ and Sports Mega-Events  
‘Legacy’ as a concept has, within a short space of time, entered the pantheon of abused, maligned 
misquoted and misunderstood concepts in popular discourse and sports studies alike. This needs 
to be borne in mind when reviewing policy documents, media articles, private-sector reports and 
academic works on first- and second-order sports mega-events (Black, 2008). On the broadest 
level, legacy is commonly defined as ‘a gift of personal property by will’ or as ‘anything handed 
down from the past, as from an ancestor or predecessor’ (Agha et al., 2012: 131). However, 
despite the significant attention paid to those legacies that are assumed to emerge from sporting 
occasions, the precise meaning of sports legacy remains remarkably unclear. Preuss’ (2007: 211) 
definition is probably one of the most cited today in which he states that legacies are ‘planned 
and unplanned, positive and negative, tangible and intangible structures created by and for a 
sport event that remain for a longer time than the event itself.’  
 
The foremost reason for the remaining uncertainty surrounding the meaning of ‘legacy’  is that, 
in the majority of cases, etymological clarity gives way to SME legacies being understood simply 
4 
 
as a given; something that is self-evident and positive; something that leads to desired, long-term 
‘outcomes’ (cf. Cashman, 2006; Preuss, 2007; Girginov, 2011; Leopkey and Parent, 2012). We 
maintain that such a positive discourse is upheld by a ‘coalition of beneficiaries’, that is, those 
likely to benefit most from the investment into a SME. While the reasons for hosting may be 
nuanced slightly, depending on the type of state hosting, overall the rationale for investing in 
SMEs is strikingly similar across the board (see below).   
A significant and ever-growing body of scholarly work has sought to explain why states host 
SMEs, and, more importantly, what legacy outcomes are envisaged by various national leaders 
and other stakeholders (see, for example: Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006; Grix, 2012; 2013; 2014; 
Kidd, 2013; Shipway and Fyall, 2013; Conchas, 2014; Frawley and Adair, 2014; Tomlinson, 2014; 
Weed, 2014). Interestingly, there does not appear to be a great deal of difference between regime 
types in terms of hoped-for legacies; thus, advanced capitalist, autocratic and communist states 
share similar aims through hosting SMEs. The above works have been complemented admirably 
by those who focus on the main aims set out by specific sports events – which generally equate 
to hoped-for legacies from the events - the most notable of which, in the context of the Olympic 
Games, includes: Sydney’s hosting of the 2000 Games (Faulkner et al., 2000; Stewart et al., 2004; 
Cashman, 2006; Lenskyj, 2012; Veal et al., 2012); the beleaguered 2004 Games in Athens 
(Tziralis et al., 2006; Hede, 2005; Boukas et al., 2013); the ‘communist-consumerist’ 2008 Games 
in Beijing (Xu, 2006; Jinxia and Managan., 2008; Manzenreiter, 2010; Zhang and Zhao, 2009; 
Preuss and Alfs, 2011; Giulianotti, 2015); the London 2012 Games (Girginov and Hills, 2008; 
2009; Girginov, 2011; Bloyce and Lovett, 2012; Green, 2012; Weed et al., 2012; Weed, 2014; 
Devine, 2013); Sochi’s staging of the 2014 Winter Olympics (Alekseyena, 2014; Orttung and 
Zhemukhov, 2014; Grix and Kramareva, 2015; Muller, 2015; Golubchikov, 2017); and Rio’s 
organization of the 2016 Games (Almeida et al., 2014; Osorio and Versiani, 2014; Grix et al., 
2015; Rocha, 2015; 2017; Bizarro et al., 2016).  
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One way of gaining traction on the vast literature that has developed around SMEs is to divide 
them into the types of legacies most often put forward by the ‘coalition of beneficiaries’ (see 
below), commentators and academics. We derived five often overlapping categories:  
1. Economic 
2. Urban re-generation 
3. National pride/feelgood factor 
4. Increased participation in physical activity and sport 
5. International prestige and ‘soft power’. 
 
The first legacy of an SME is thought to be an increase in economic revenue for cities and states, 
generated directly through such things as tickets receipts and increased employment 
opportunities for the local population; and also indirectly, via increases in short- and long-term 
foreign direct investments, as well as gains in incoming tourists. The evidence for economic 
legacies is difficult to find, given the number of variables that need to be considered. Perhaps, of 
more importance is the fact that ‘despite the enormous cultural penumbra of the World Cup and 
the Olympics, the events are really quite small quantitatively in relation to the economy of the 
host country’ (Zimbalist, 2015: 38; cf. Allmers and Maennig, 2009; Maennig and Zimbalist, 
2012). Tourism is often negatively effected around such events, as people stay away who would 
have otherwise travelled to the host country (labelled in some academic work as the 
‘displacement effect’) (see: Fourie et al., 2011; cf. Chalip and Costa, 2005). The second category, 
urban regeneration, describes the opportunities and benefits to society, in particular through the 
redevelopment of waste land, neighbourhoods and transport systems. There is little doubt that 
Stratford in East London was ‘regenerated’, but whether - as is the case with most SMEs - it was 
in the best interests of the local citizenry is another matter (cf. Gold and Gold, 2008; Short, 
2008; Alm et al., 2014). A third category in the literature thought to be the result of hosting an 
SME is an increase in so-called ‘psychic income’, produced by the euphoria and exhilaration that 
surrounds the event, leading to a heightened sense of ‘communitas’ (Turner, 1979) and a 
strengthening of national pride (cf. Black and Van Der Westhuizen, 2004; Tomlinson and 
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Young, 2006; Giulianotti, 2016); this then is said to culminate in a feel-good factor among the 
nation’s population (cf. Kavetsos and Szymanski, 2010). A fourth legacy category is the 
assumption that through viewing superstar athletes and role models, the excitement felt during 
the event and the sporting and infrastructural facilities available post-event combine to boost 
sports participation among the masses in the host country (cf. Grix, 2012; Nicholson et al., 2011; 
Frawley et al., 2013; Weed, 2014). This, in turn, leads to the prevention of diseases caused by 
sedentary lifestyles, and thus to significant long-term savings in health costs. This will be dealt 
with in more detail below, but suffice to say prior to London no SME had attempted to stimulate 
mass participation so explicitly as London and there is little evidence that an SME has had a 
direct causal impact on sports participation (Weed et. al., 2009). Finally, SMEs are thought to 
offer valuable promotional opportunities for cities and states who seek to enhance their image 
globally, especially given their ability to attract unprecedented numbers of international 
spectators through global media coverage. Such a platform is used to showcase the host nation, 
reshape dominant attitudes, transcend provincialism and historic insecurities, and/or embrace 
globality, competitiveness, and excellence. Additionally, states commonly seek to go beyond 
simple branding by using SMEs a part of a ‘package’ of ‘soft power’ with which they seek to 
strengthen their influence on the global stage (see: Grix and Brannagan, 2016). Interestingly, this 
is the one ‘legacy’ that most states appear to believe can work (cf. Black and Van Der 
Westhuizen, 2004; Chalip and Costa, 2005; Cornelissen, 2010; Van Hilvoorde, et al., 2010; 
Cornelissen et al., 2011; Brannagan and Rookwood, 2016).  
 
The above touches on the core legacy categories that make up the justifications for hosting 
SMEs in the first place. There are, naturally, differences of opinion among commentators as to 
which legacies to prioritise and whether they actually materialise in the manner hosts generally 
hope. One way of conceiving of the breadth of opinions on SMEs and legacies is to picture a 
continuum along which one end is positive and the other is negative, bearing in mind that this is 
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simply an exercise in categorisation to clarify the types of opinions that exist. Stakeholders may 
hold several and different opinions depending on the event in question. Clearly what we term the 
‘coalition of beneficiaries’ - that is, stakeholders who accentuate the positives of hosting SMEs - 
would be at the ‘positive’ end. This group includes international sports governing bodies, such as 
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the International Paralympic Committee (IPC), 
national governing bodies, non-sporting national governments and their subsidiary organizations, 
and politicians, sports administrators, business leaders and sections of the media. Among this 
coalition the negative aspects of SMEs are rarely considered. The key contributors to a positive 
legacy discourse are, unsurprisingly, international sports organisations. In the IOC’s Olympic 
Legacy Report (2013: 1), for example, former President, Jacques Rogge, unquestionably 
advocates how the Games create ‘a unique set of environmental, social and economic legacies 
that can change a community, a region, and a nation forever’; in similar fashion, Hu Jintao, 
former-President of China, in 2008 echoed his belief that ‘hosting the Beijing Olympic Games 
will leave us a number of sports venues and infrastructure. We treasure these material legacies 
very much and will give a full play to their function and roles’ (Jin and Bu, 2010: 255); 
furthermore, Sochi’s bid for the 2014 Winter Olympics were based on the belief that the Games 
would ‘modernise the region by creating new infrastructure in rail, road, telecommunications, 
energy and accommodation and through the construction of sports venues’ (IOC 2014 
Evaluation Commission Report, 2007: 10); and finally, Rio de Janeiro’s 2016 Olympic bid was 
founded on the clear conviction that the Games would ‘strengthen the social and environmental 
fabric of Rio and of Brazil’ (Rio 2016 Candidature File, 2009: 7).  
 
One step down from the mainly positive endorsements of IGBs lie private-sector organizations 
who offer national authorities legacy consultancy services, reports, measurements and 
recommendations. This group of stakeholders look to benefit from the discourse surrounding 
the promotion of legacy as an achievable outcome, albeit under the assumption that ‘legacy’ is 
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not a necessarily natural process, but rather something that requires continuous ‘expert’ support 
and evaluation. Examples include Ernst and Young’s ‘Bang for the Buck’ (2015: 2) report, which 
recognizes that sport events can be ‘a significant driver of economic and social development’, yet 
argue that to ‘optimize their impact’, governments should follow their ‘nine channels’ in ensuring 
a ‘lasting, positive legacy’; in similar fashion, Deloitte’s ‘A Lasting Legacy’ (2010: 1) report, which 
advocates that ‘major sports events can drive positive change for host communities and 
economies’, offers ‘practical and proven insights to help cities and countries capture and host a 
successful event that delivers a legacy of positive and lasting change’; and Amion’s UK 
Government-funded ‘Regeneration Legacy Evaluation’ report (2015: 5) advocates the staging of 
the 2012 Olympics will ‘transform the Lower Lea Valley and contribute to the regeneration of 
East London’ as well as result in ‘a range of wider sub-national and national benefits’, and, in 
doing so, offers up a set of evaluative findings, which it considers to be ‘important for a number 
of reasons’.  
 
Next on our continuum - and moving towards a more critical take on SMEs and legacies - is the 
media. The media are at once part of the coalition of beneficiaries, but also represent a number 
of journalists and media commentators, who, on occasion, offer a critical perspective of the 
ability of SMEs to produce their intended legacies. However, this critique is often balanced by 
the underlying belief that leveraging a positive legacy from an SME is an achievable target. This 
is demonstrated by an article printed in The Independent (18 August, 2008) just days before the 
closing ceremony marked the end of the 2008 Beijing Games: ‘The best Olympics regenerate 
neglected districts, inspire children to take up sport and leave a city furnished with world-class 
venues...the worst are poisoned chalices that leave a nation in debt and a city overrun by white 
elephants’. This seems to imply a link between the quality of an Olympic Games and legacy 
benefits a country can reap; that despite dangers of negative impacts, if the Games are good 
enough, the benefits should follow. In relation to the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, The 
9 
 
Telegraph (26 February, 2014) adopts a similar standpoint in highlighting ‘positive’ legacies from 
past Olympics, counter-balanced by casting a critical gaze over those that have not been 
realised: ‘There have been instances where the Olympic Games gave the host city a new lease of 
life…...However, many host cities have also been left with former Olympic venues that are 
scarcely used’; and The Guardian’s (29 November, 2011) view that Rio 2016 will present Brazil 
‘opportunities abound but [that] the occasion is also riddled with dangers’ likewise echoes similar 
sentiments. In short, while offering a more critical perspective on the legacies left by SME’s than 
both the group of IGB’s, NGB’s and political leaders, and that of private sector stakeholders, the 
media, in many cases, fall short of outright scepticism of legacy as an achievable thing in itself, 
instead identifying it as conceivable, if often unrealised.   
 
Finally, the next stage of our continuum would be the group of academics who, through their 
previous and on-going research, argue that intended SME legacies are commonly unachievable 
and often overstated, leading, in the majority of cases, to negative outcomes for their hosts. For 
example, although SMEs have been seen to be an effective addition to economic development, 
academics have reminded us that in numerous cases such events result in a legacy of financial 
burden to their hosts (cf. Chalkley and Essex, 1999; Searle, 2005); the 1972 Olympic Games left 
Munich with debts of up to £178 million, for instance, and four years later in Montreal the 
Games provided debts of up to £692 million (cf. Gratton et al., 2000). Furthermore, beliefs 
surrounding positive urban regeneration, employment growth, increases in sports participation 
and tourism gains have all been questioned by academics (cf. Preuss, 2004; Toohey and Veal, 
2007; Grix, 2014); the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles and the 2000 Games in Sydney, for 
example, both witnessed significant decreases in regular tourism numbers during their respective 
events (cf. Horne & Manzenreiter, 2004; Preuss, 2004); and, in concluding on the majority of 
scientific findings, Collins (2010: 376; cf. Vigor et al., 2004) suggests that ‘there is no evidence of 
the short-lived spectacle of the Games ever sustainably promoting greater participation of health 
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benefits’. Furthermore, although SMEs can promote the existence and/or appeal of a city or 
state, for those hosts unprepared for the international attention that accompanies these events, 
there is always the potential for one’s global image to be significantly tarnished (leading to what 
Brannagan and Giulianotti (2014; 2015: 706) term ‘soft disempowerment’). The 2010 
Commonwealth Games in Delhi, for example, have long been remembered for their disastrous 
preparations and subsequent international critique, most particularly in connection to the 
country’s adherence to the use of child labour (see Sengupta’s piece in this Special Issue). Thus, 
from an academic perspective, claims that SMEs bring about achievable outcomes which 
significantly contribute to the host’s long-term socio-economic climate have been, and continue 
to be, based on a distinct lack of (historical) evidence (cf. Miller, 2002; Horne and Manzenreiter, 
2006). 
 
Given such differences in opinion on the efficacy of SMEs and legacies, there remains a 
significant misalignment between the legacy claims and discourse of the coalition of beneficiaries 
and the short- and long-term evidence of public benefits arising from such events. To discuss 
this misalignment still further we take the over-arching London 2012 legacy promise of 
increasing participation in sport and physical activity and hold it up against the existing evidence. 
What is interesting in the UK case is the fact that winning the bid to host the Games signals a 
change in sport policy away from ‘sport for all’ towards an elite sport policy focus. The interest 
lies in the fact that the successful Olympic bid in 2005 was based on increasing sport 
participation - that is, more a ‘sport for all’ policy - yet led to the increasing importance of elite 
sport policy.  
 
London’s Legacy Promise: ‘Inspiring a Generation’ 
 
Given the contrasting beliefs around the ability of SMEs to produce the desired outcomes of 
hosts, it is perhaps surprising that London’s staging of the 2012 Olympic Games was the most 
11 
 
ambitious yet in terms of legacy ‘promises’. Indeed, London’s legacy aims were both ambitious 
and wide ranging, underpinned by the assumption that the Games would leave behind a 
significant ‘sporting, social and economic legacy’ for the UK (London 2012 Candidate File, 2005: 
1; cf. Bloyce and Lovett, 2012; Girginov and Hills, 2008: 2092). This clear belief in the ability of 
the Games to translate into short- and long-term social and economic gains led to the creation of 
five key promises (discussed below).  
 
An analysis of the wide range of documents written by a variety of government arm’s length 
bodies relating to the Olympics and its legacy indicates the clear expectation that the Games 
were seen as a major intervention to drive up participation. The discussion below not only points 
to the positive discourse around ‘legacy’ and a number of government definitions of this 
concept, it also seeks to shed some light on the intended aims of the documents themselves. 
Diagram 1: London 2012 Legacy Document Timeline 
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In reviewing the documents depicted in Diagram 1, there are three things we can say on the 
government’s London 2012 legacy discourse. First, the UK government clearly believe in the 
benefits of hosting SMEs; indeed, appearing early within the UK Government’s publication of 
the ‘London 2012 Candidate File’, the belief existed that, by hosting the Games, long term social, 
economic, political and sporting legacies would be achieved (ibid.). In the specific case of 
London, five continuous legacy objectives were believed to be achievable before, during and 
after the hosting of the Games (see: Our Promise for 2012, DCMS, 2008):  
1. ‘Making the UK a ‘world-class sporting nation’ - both in terms of elite performance and high 
levels of participation amongst the masses;  
2. To ‘transform the heart of East London’, and, in doing so, creating new homes, transport 
facilities and business opportunities;  
3. To ‘inspire a new generation of young people’ to partake in volunteering and various cultural 
activities;  
4. Ensure the Olympic Park acts as a blueprint for sustainable living; and  
5. Position the UK as a ‘creative, inclusive and welcoming place to live in, visit and for business’. 
The ability of the Games to actually achieve these five legacy promises has been called into 
question by various media commentators and academics alike (cf. Girginov and Hills, 2008; Gold 
and Gold, 2009; Weed et al., 2012; Weed, 2014; Green, 2012; Devine, 2013; Grix et. al., 2015). 
On regeneration, for example, the Athletes’ Olympic Village and the Olympic Stadium have 
appeared to have benefited private investors far more than the average taxpayer, with the Qatar 
Investment Authority and private-company, Delaney, purchasing the former in 2011, and the 
latter being taken over by West Ham United Football Club as of late-2016 (The Guardian, 12 
August, 2011; The Independent, 16 September, 2016). The shift of resources from pre-event public 
funding to post-event private business benefit is one that appears to occur across time, space and 
types of SMEs (see in particular the submissions by Black and Sepgupta in this Special Issue). 
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Furthermore, David Cameron’s claim that the 2012 Games would leave a ‘lasting economic 
legacy that will benefit the whole country’ has also been doubted, with the government’s 
estimated returns now appearing to be widely exaggerated (cf. The Independent, 9 June, 2012; 
Financial Times, 21 July, 2013); on volunteering, in May 2013, research found that the 
government’s ambitions had also been dramatically overstated, with many local-based charities 
and voluntary organizations witnessing little difference than before the Games were hosted (cf. 
The Independent, 2nd May, 2013; The Independent, 16 July, 2013); and finally, although the Games 
may have gone some way in demonstrating the UK’s creativity, the nation’s inability to plan prior 
to the event with regard to such things as security measures and the availability of tickets did 
little for the UK’s image on the international scene (The Guardian, 24 July, 2012; The Guardian, 24 
April, 2013).  
 
The majority of government documents listed above had in common the belief that the Games 
would lead to an increase in mass sporting participation. The centrality of using the Games for 
fostering greater levels of mass participation was reflected first in the 2002 publication, ‘Game 
Plan’, and then in five of the UK’s legacy documents leading up to and after the Games:  ‘London 
2012: funding and legacy’ (2007); ‘The Next Lap’ (2008); ‘Playing to Win’ (2008); ‘A Sporting Future for 
London’ (2009); and ‘Keeping the Flame Alive’ (2013). Throughout these documents, the belief 
appears to exist that hosting the Games will ‘get more people taking up sport’, and this, in turn, 
will lead to expanding the ‘pool of talented English sportsmen and women’ (DCMS, Playing to 
Win, 2008: 2). The UK Government’s target was to use the hosting of the Games to encourage 
‘one million more people doing sport by 2012’ (Mayor of London, A Sporting Future for 
London, 2009: 13), leading to significant, long-term health benefits, but also to a counter the 
broader social issues of crime, academic underachievement and a lack of community cohesion 
(ibid.: 9). This target was unceremoniously dropped by the UK Conservative-led coalition 
government on coming to power in 2010.  
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The Power of Elite Sport to Inspire? 
 
The announcement of London as the host of the 2012 Olympic Games in 2005 added impetus 
to an elite policy focus that had begun to crystalize, first, with the introduction of lottery funding 
for elite sport in 1997 and, significantly, in the Government’s 2002 sport policy treatise, Game 
Plan. The latter document, put together by the incumbent Labour Government, did, however, 
shed some doubt on the causal link between hosting a major Games and its ability to stimulate 
physical activity and sport participation among the masses. Game Plan claims that international 
sporting success ‘boosts the profile of a sport and increases interest in participation’ 
(DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002, p. 9). However, later in that document, there is a clarification that 
‘the interactions between participation, international competition and hosting events are unclear’ 
(2002, p. 14). The document goes on to point out that ‘international success does not appear to 
stimulate sustained increases in participation’ (DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002). Such an observation 
chimes with the extant literature looking at participation legacies from sports mega-events (see 
Weed et. al. 2009, 2014; Coalter, 2007). Winning the Olympic bid in 2005 and introducing the 
now infamous ‘no compromise’ approach to elite sport funding by UK Sport in 2006 appears to 
suggest that the caution from 2002 had given way to the belief in a causal relationship between 
elite sport success/SME hosting and increased sport and physical activity participation (although 
these two categories were not always specified; see Weed et. al., 2009).  
 
The roots of an elite sport policy focus can be found - as is often the case in sport - in a 
spectacularly bad performance of the GB squad in the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. The hallowed 
Olympic medal table has long been viewed as a barometer of a nation’s health, bound up as it is 
with national pride. GB finished 36th in Atlanta in 1996, their worst performance ever. The aim 
to improve this, the introduction of lottery funding (1997) and the belief that elite sport 
performance impacts mass participation rates, is behind the UK shifting their focus away from 
15 
 
grassroots and towards elite sport funding. The planning for and winning of the London 2012 
bid in 2005 further recalibrated the UK’s sport policy focus more towards elite sport and away 
from grass-roots sport. Thus, poor elite performance and low sports participation rates were 
addressed by focusing on elite sport policy to improve elite performance and improve 
participation rates among the masses. An elite sport policy remains in place today despite a 
change in Government.  
 
The political mood was and still is - across political opinion - united; the UK Labour party’s 
broad elite sport focus, the party in power when the London bid was won, was taken over 
seamlessly by the Conservative-led coalition in 2010. Just prior to the election, Labour 
demonstrated the shift in policy by publishing (through the Department of Culture, Media and 
Sport) its sport policy document, Playing to Win: A New Era for Sport (2008), which spelt out 
clearly the government’s elite-driven sport policy to achieve both more mass sports participation 
through Olympic medal success – effectively outlining the tenets of the ‘virtuous cycle’ of sport. 
The ‘virtuous cycle’ is an attempt to build on the ‘trickle-down’ or ‘pyramid’ models of the 
relationship between elite and mass sport (see Van Bottenburg, 2002: 2; see also Hanstad and 
Skille, 2010). In a nutshell this model holds that elite success on the international stage and/or 
the successful staging of sports mega-events (SMEs) leads to increased global prestige for 
national leaders and nation-states; both also contributes to a collective sense of (national) 
identity; this, then, boosts a greater mass sport participation, leading to a healthier populace; this, 
in turn, provides a bigger ‘pool’ of talent from which to choose the elite stars of the future and 
ensure continued success. The process then starts over again (Grix and Carmichael, 2012). 
 
One of the more recent UK Government documents on the London Olympics and its legacy 
boldly articulates the causality of ‘mega-event = participation’ by stating categorically that the 
games: 
16 
 
…will help to unlock talent. And the first priority of the Games is to make the 
UK a world-leading sporting nation. We hope to see people becoming 
increasingly active, with a goal of seeing two million people more active by 
2012 through focused investment in our sporting infrastructure and better 
support and information for people wanting to be active. The new focus on 
sporting excellence in England will reinvigorate clubs and coaching, which will 
attract and bring on young sporting talent. (DCMS 2008: 3) 
 
Nowhere is the belief in elite sport inspiring the masses and the old adage ‘build facilities and 
they will come’ more pronounced. Both of these assumptions have been shown - over time and 
a variety of cases - to be wrong. There is, however, no doubting that the Government’s elite 
sport focus has effectively kick-started the UK’s rise in elite sport prowess. In the three Olympics 
since winning the bid (2008, 2012 and 2016), team GB have finished 4th, 3rd and 2nd respectively. 
The UK government fully engaged in and supported London’s hosting of the 2012 Olympic 
Games, which was awarded in June 2005. By 2006 an extra £200 million of taxpayer’s money 
was invested into the development of elite sport - on-top of the £100 million lottery funding 
already in-place - as part of the government’s ‘no compromise’ plan to ensure success in 2012. 
The Olympic success in 2012 and 2016 in terms of medals won served to underline the ‘success’ 
of the government’s sport policy approach. 
 
According to UK Government documents the legacies sought from the 2012 Games have 
largely been successfully accomplished. In the 2014 publication, ‘Inspired by 2012 (2nd Annual 
Report: 8)’, for example, the claim is made that ‘There is much to be proud of in what has already 
been achieved’; in supporting this claim, the document then lists the investments made in 
ensuring, in particular, that the UK has benefitted from the hosting of the Games with regard to 
health and well-being, pointing to investments made in grassroots sports facilities, initiatives and 
schools; what the report fails to pinpoint, however, is how many more people across the UK 
have actually been inspired to take up sport, or increase their exiting participation. The same can 
be said for the government’s ‘Inspired by 2012 (3rd Annual Report, 2015: 10)’, which, again, largely 
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provides readers with an overview of investments made in sporting facilities; a notable exception 
here is the claim that, through the hosting of the Games, by 2014, 400,000 Londoners were 
‘participating in grassroots sport and physical activities’.  To further examine this claim that the 
2012 legacy promise of ‘inspiring a generation’ to participate - particularly, in sport - a good place 
to start is by looking at the (government-sponsored) participation data. A word of caution is 
perhaps necessary here - the Active People’s Survey (APS) (which was launched, incidentally, in 
the same year Great Britain won the Olympic bid in 2005), is not without issues (see Carmichael 
et. al., 2013).  Diagram 2 below shows the sports participation and physical activity rates across 
England since the UK’s awarding of the 2012 Games.  
 
Diagram 2: Sports Participation and Physical Activity in England (taken from Active People 
Survey)  
From this, there are three things to note. First, it would appear that short spikes in sports 
participation overall occurred both immediately after London was awarded the Games as well as 
leading up to the hosting of the Games themselves, but, nonetheless, have started on a slow 
decline post-2012 to almost the same levels of participation evident in 2005. Second, the same 
can arguably be said for participation in sport ‘at least once a week’; again, we see a spike from 
2007-2009 and then again in 2012, but these figures too now appear to be entering into a slow 
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decline. And third, since data from the Active People Survey was collected in 2012, we see that 
there is a steady increase in those who are considered to be ‘physically active’, although this 
covers a wide-range of activities from dance, recreational walking and gardening (Sport England). 
In seeking to unpick these figures, Diagram 3 details the ‘physically active’ rates across England 
by location. From this, we can see that over half of the locations chosen have witnessed a 
decrease in physical activity since London’s staging of the Games in 2012.  
 
Diagram 3: ‘Physically Active’ (150-599 moderate-to-vigorous physical activity) by Location 
(England) (Active People Survey) 
There is some evidence that the situation may be different in the Home Countries where the 
Home Nation Sports Councils seem to have been better prepared to embrace the increased 
participation challenge. Gymnastics, Triathlon, Swimming and athletics have all sustained 
increases. The Western Mail (1 August, 2016) reported, for example: 
London 2012 saw Welsh athletes break a number of records on the 
international stage. We not only capitalised on the great success of the Games 
but managed to sustain that enthusiasm – bucking a downward trend in 
participation seen in other home nations a couple of years after the Games. 
Since the games we’ve seen a record number of people in Wales taking part in 
physical activity. Our Active Adults survey shows 41% of people are taking 
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part in some sort of sporting activity three times a week, up from 39% in 
2012. The results are even better for children with 48% hooked on sport 
compared to 40% in 2013. More people are volunteering in Wales than ever 
before and club membership is at an all-time high. 
Nonetheless, in general terms, the England Active People Survey (2013) reported that the 
number of 16-25 year olds playing sport across the nation had actually decreased since London’s 
hosting of the Games, with the percentage of those with the lowest family incomes participating 
in sport at its lowest since 2005 (cf. The Guardian, 12 December, 2013; The Guardian, 5th July, 
2015). Furthermore, Diagram 4 shows the sports participation of selected sports over the past 10 
years, encompassing both the build up to and the hosting of the Olympics, as well as post-
Games participation figures. The ten sports were selected on the basis of being Olympic 
disciplines, and thus, would be the most likely to see increases in participation as a result of the 
Games.  
 
Diagram 4: England Sports Participation Rates (2005-2015) (Source: Active People Survey) 
 
In addition, the sports selected were those within which winning an Olympic medal is deemed 
the pinnacle of the sport, thus discounting sports such as football, tennis and golf, within which 
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this would arguably be surpassed by other achievements such as the FIFA World Cup, Grand 
Slam and Major title victories. Finally, as cost is such a significant barrier for sports participation 
among young people (Street Games, 2015), the selected sports were also deemed to be the most 
accessible of those meeting the first two criteria, due to limited equipment requirements and 
local club access.  
Diagram 4 most notably indicates three phenomena. First it shows a rise in participation in the 
two sports of athletics and cycling, in which figures rose from 0.98 million in 2005/06 to 1.76 
million in 2014/15, and 1.28 million  in 2005/06 to 1.67 million in 2014/15, respectively (Table 
2). In both cases, the increases are statistically significant; however, in cycling, participation has 
only risen by around 27, 000 since London 2012 and actually decreased between 2013/14 and 
2014/15. Second, the participation figures in swimming decreased significantly from 2.58 million 
in 2005/06 to 2.05 million in 2014/15, a decline of almost half a million people since London 
won the right to host the Games, the exact opposite of the promise set out by the Government. 
Third, as also indicated in table 1, of the remaining 7 sports, badminton, volleyball and hockey all 
significantly increased their participation from 2005/06 to 2014/15, boxing, table tennis and 
netball all significantly increased participation over this time frame, whilst there was no 
significant change within gymnastics.  
 APS1 
(2005/6) 
APS6 
(2011/12) 
APS9 
(2014/15) 
Increase/Decrease 
Swimming 2,583,300 2,403,700 2,051,500 Decrease 
Athletics 983,500 1,514,700 1,758,900 Increase 
Cycling 1,282,600 1,620,000 1,666,900 Increase 
Badminton 376,300 396,700 325,000 Decrease 
Volleyball 18,600 16,400 12,600 Decrease 
Hockey 35,400 46,500 42,900 Decrease 
Gymnastics 24,200 15,200 21,400 No Change 
Boxing 49,900 84,300 87,300 Increase 
Table Tennis 56,500 74,700 74,200 Increase 
Netball 47,600 65,700 68,200 Increase 
Table 1 - England Sport participation in 2005/06, 2011/12 and 2014/15 (Source: Active People 
Survey) 
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Overall, however, it can be clearly seen from diagram 4 that levels of participation have fallen 
significantly short of the promise to ‘inspire a generation’. Given the Active People Survey data, 
it is unsurprising that the Conservative-led coalition government abandoned in 2010 the original 
aim of ‘two million people [being] more active by 2012’ when it became clear that this target was 
unachievable. In order to meet those targets, the participatory increases seen in cycling and 
athletics would have to be seen across all sports, which, as diagram 4 indicates, was not the case; 
rather, it suggests the government over-estimated the impact that hosting the Games would have 
on sports participation.  
 
London 2012 was the first Olympic or Paralympic Games that formally set out increased 
participation as a legacy aim, and thus the first to implement leveraging strategies in order for the 
outcome to be achieved. The Active People Survey data suggests, however, that London 2012 
did not lead to increased levels of sports participation. It would appear that the caution and 
scepticism adopted by many commentators on the ability of SMEs to inspire increased 
participation is justified. The ‘coalition of beneficiaries’ - made up as it is of IGBs, NGBs, 
national authorities, political leaders, business and parts of the media - have a tendency to over-
exaggerate the impact of a range of legacies from SMEs to ensure they secure the event in the 
first place (see Bason and Grix, 2017).   
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This article serves as a general introduction to the subject of ‘legacies’ of sports mega-events 
covered by the international scholars whose contributions make up this SI. The burgeoning 
literature on this topic offers a number of different views on what ‘legacy’ is, how and whether it 
can be achieved and the shape it can take. There is clearly a positive ‘discourse’ around SME 
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legacies that has caught the ear of a wide number of states irrespective of their political leaning, 
developmental stage, geographical region or cultural heritage. The Middle East is slowly 
becoming a serial SME host – if mostly for smaller-scale events; East Asia is set to underline its 
prominence as an SME host with the next three Olympics being held in the region 
(Pyeongchang, 2018, Winter Olympics; Tokyo, 2020, Summer and Beijing, 2022, Winter); 
traditional ‘democratic’ states continue to invest in SMEs in the hope of specific legacy benefits 
(cf. Gold Coast Commonwealth Games, 2018; Tokyo Olympics, 2020), while less democratic 
states seek to boost their image through hosting (Russia and Qatar, FIFA World Cup, 2018 and 
2022 respectively). Unfortunately, for such hosts, legacies may not be the type they had hoped 
for.  
 
We have considered the wide variety of views on SME legacies and sought to disentangle an 
often opaque debate. The premise that elite sport success and hosting SMEs inspires the ‘masses’ 
to participate in sport and physical activity is, as this paper discussed, difficult to evidence in the 
UK and beyond. Many of the themes touched upon in this paper recur throughout the 
international case studies in this Special Issue and it is clear that over-exaggerating post-event 
legacies appears to be one theme that is common to most.  
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